there is much conceptual confusion about social capital and why (or whether) it might effect government performance. I shall argue below that most of social capital is irrelevant to good government and the important aspect of social capital, generalized trust, has been poorly measured in other studies.
Beyond social capital, I offer a vision of the civil state as a polity where people trust others who are unlike themselves, where there is minimal political divisiveness, where leaders work with each other toward finding some common ground, and where the political environment militates against confrontation. This civil state has better, more effective government because there is less back-biting and at least some of its foundations lead to greater honesty in government and more participation toward the common good by ordinary citizens.
Better theory and better measurement lead to firmer support for the link between trust and performance. Second, trust is important because it leads to a more cooperative, less polarized society and polity: The decline in Congressional productivity over the past three to four decades has a direct linkage to falling levels of generalized trust; as we have less faith in each other, there are more filibusters and gridlock in the Congress and the ideological gap between the Congressional parties has grown (Uslaner, 1993, ch. 6; 2002, 214) . A less polarized polity is more productive (see also Binder, 1999) . Knack (2002, 778) briefly makes an argument about polarization, but his measures (divided government and racial heterogeneity) do not tap people's preferences.
I shall present models of good government in the civil state for the American states. The Uslaner, The Civil State (4) models emphasize political polarization, relying upon measures of partisan polarization from national surveys and from state legislative voting. More trusting and less polarized states should have more effective government. The evidence for trust is generally strong, but polarization effects are more sporadic (and, in one case, even positive). I also consider other political variables and find that high levels of party competition leading to divided government generally lead to less effective government, as do strong party organizations. Traditionally, we think of the most "innovative" (and perhaps most "effective") state governments to be dominated by liberals, but instead I find that effectiveness in management is greatest in states where the dominant party is most conservative.
"Social capital" matters mightily for good government, but not as Putnam's argument would lead us to expect. It is trust, not civic engagement, that leads to good government.
Trust is significant for most of the measures of government quality, but it has more powerful effects for corruption (see Uslaner, 2004) . Corruption thrives where political competition is lacking-in one-party states and where there are strong party organizations-and where there some groups (mainly whites) are better off than others. You may need a vigilant public to guard against corruption, but as with government effectiveness more generally, civic engagement is not
enough. No measure of civic engagement leads to better government performance (see below).
A particularly demanding form of participation-the share of the public making political speeches (ranging from .05 percent in New Jersey to 9 percent in Oregon and South Dakota)-does combat corruption -but this is hardly the sort of political participation that we might expect of ordinary citizens.
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Good Government and Good Citizens
Good government means different things to different people and that is one reason it has proven so difficult to measure. We normally think of effective government as including strong service delivery, impartial bureaucrats and judges, and the honesty of government officials (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi, 2003) . These factors are terribly difficult to measure. There are multiple measures of government corruption, including the indictment and conviction rates of political leaders and newspaper reporters' subjective estimates of corruption (Boylan and Long, 2001) , which is closest to international estimates of corruption by Transparency International.
However, measures of overall quality have been elusive.
The GPP measures are an attempt to provide some data on governmental effectiveness.
They are not measures of legislative productivity or policy gridlock in the states (which might be ideal). They are indicators of state capacity and bureaucratic functioning. The five measures and some of their components are (King, Zeckhauser, and Kim, 2001, 31-32 ; see also Knack, 2002, 775-776 annually since 1986 for public sector initiatives in areas including "customer focus" (meeting the demands of diverse constituencies); public-private competition; "performance benchmarking"
(developing clear standards for evaluating governmental effectiveness); citizen participation; consumer choice, and privatization (Altshuler, 1997; Sparrow, 2000, 81) . These awards measure not only performance, but also doing things differently than before-suggesting that the roots of innovation may be different from simple measures of performance such as the GPP indicators.
These measures may not be ideal, but they are the best available on the quality of state
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government-with one exception, a measure of corruption by statehouse political reporters in 1999 reported by Boylan and Long (2001 Boylan-Long measure and the overall correlation between the two measures is just .259. The reporters' measure seems to be the better one, since it has greater face validity. Prosecution indicators may reflect the personal priorities of prosecutors (Boylan and Long, 2001, 3-4) -and it may simply be more difficult to gain an indictment and conviction in a heavily corrupt state.
Thus, I rely upon the reporters' perception measure, which seems less troubled by endogeneity issues (such as whom to prosecute and whom to convict).
I now turn to an examination of the role of trust in civic life, to other predictors of government performance, the results for the five GPP indicators and the Ford Foundation/ Kennedy school awards, and then a theoretical and empirical discussion of corruption.
The Civil State and Good Government
The civil state is a moderate state. Citizens in civil states trust people who are different
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from each other. They seek to avoid confrontation and to seek common ground in decisionmaking. People in polarized societies don't trust folks who disagree with them. Different views become a sign of heresy rather than simple disagreement. Fundamentalists, be they religious or political, are likely to trust only their own kind-and to favor confrontation over compromise.
Good government requires a commitment to seeking common ground-and it will have difficulty flourishing in a confrontational political environment. So where the public or the elites (legislative leaders) are highly polarized, it will be more difficult to obtain effective government.
In states where we find strong political party organizations, we may also find fewer incentives for Perhaps the most important part of the civil state is the level of trust. In such a state, high levels of people say that most people can be trusted (as opposed to agreeing that "you can't be too careful in dealing with people"). Elsewhere I show that this question, which has been asked in a large number of national surveys since 1960, reflects a variety of trust that is not based upon
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experience. Instead, it is based upon a world view of optimism and control: The world is a good place, it is going to get better, and I can help make it better. People who trust others are more tolerant of minorities, more willing to give of themselves through charity and volunteering time, and see interactions with people of different backgrounds as opportunities rather than risks.
Generalized trust is faith in people who are different from yourself (in contrast to faith only in your kind, particularized trust, see Uslaner, 2002, chs. 2-3) . Generalized trusters look for common ground with people of different backgrounds and views-so trust is the font of cooperation and compromise and is the opposite of polarization. Divided societies-through ideological polarization and especially from economic inequality (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 6, 8 )-rank low on trust.
Trusting societies have good government because their citizens put aside differences to work for common purposes-not because they are active in politics or even in civic affairs. When we join civic groups, and especially in our informal social life, we connect with people with similar interests, backgrounds, and worldviews. Our political participation usually polarizes us rather than builds trust with our opponents (Rosenblum, 1998, 48; Uslaner, 2002, chs. 2, 4) .
Political action may be important to make government more responsive to citizens, but there is no clear reason to believe that it leads to more effective government. And there is even less reason to believe that participating in choral societies or bowling leagues translates into better government.
Membership in civic groups and trust are not the same thing-and there is scant evidence that one leads to the other. It is trust in other people that matters for good government, not membership in civic groups or other participation (with one exception)-and not trust in (Knack, 2002, 779) and by legislative professionalism, the number of good government groups, the business environment, and neighboring states's rankings (King, Zeckhauser, and Kim, 2001, 30) . I considered each of these variables, but all fell to insignificance in models focusing on trust, polarization, legislative ideology, party organizational strength, and political competition. in the 1990s (see Erikson, Wright, and McIver, 1993) and were computed for me by Gerald C. My measure of elite polarization is more complex: It is based upon NOMINATE scores derived from roll call data from the American states for 1999-2000 also provided by Wright (see n. 4) . The measure I employ is the average for both legislative chambers of the absolute difference between the squared (quadratic) mean NOMINATE scores for Democrats and
Republicans. I average these measures for each party for the two chambers (one in Nebraska). I then square the NOMINATE differences and then take the absolute difference between the parties. Why such a complex measure? Most spatial models of party competition employ squared distances: Quadratic measures make larger differences more "extreme" and smaller gaps less "extreme." I believe that this formulation better captures the polarization in legislative politics than a simple difference of party positions. This is my measure of legislative polarization-and for both the mass and elite indicators, I expect negative relationships with government quality.
I also employ the ideology of the majority party in the legislature from the same NOMINATE scores, with higher scores indicating greater liberalism. There are compelling
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arguments for hypotheses in either direction: Knack (2002, 774-775) argues that much of the existing literature on quality equates performance with innovation or liberalism. So we might expect that legislatures with more liberal majority parties would have higher levels of government quality. Alternatively, these specific measures of performance focus on management and in some cases a business-oriented approach to managing government (especially for human resource management, with its emphasis on merit pay and dismissing employees). This business orientation would support a negative relationship between legislative ideology (liberalism) and performance.
Beyond these measures, I also expect that states with strong party organizations would be less likely to rank highly on these government performance measures. Strong party states, which have what Mayhew (1991) called "traditional party organizations," place a heavy emphasis on patronage and on party control of the bureaucracy. "Scientific" management is an anathema to strong parties. I use Mayhew's classification of party systems from weak to very powerful party organizations.
Divided control of the legislative and executive branches of government may lead to less productive government. When one party controls the legislative branch and another the executive branch in the United States Congress, budget deficits spiral out of control (McCubbins, 1991) . Overall, there seems to be little relationship between the enactment of major legislation and divided government (Mayhew, 1991; Binder, 1999) , but there is a strong relationship between divided government and the ability of the executive to get what (s)he wants, especially in periods when the party system is highly polarized (Conley, 2003) . Divided government may lead to more difficulties when the two major parties are relatively equal in strength. This makes
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it easier for the minority party to obstruct the agenda of the majority party. In contrast, single party government with an overwhelming majority for one party should have the least difficulty in enacting legislation. Preliminary estimations suggest that divided government per se does not shape the quality of government-however divided government interacted with the level of party competition in a state should be more likely to lead to less effective governments. Divided government might lead to greater compromise if each party is negotiating out of strength-as reflected in the dominance of one of the institutions. But where margins are tight, neither party wants to give any ground to the other. Each party might prefer standing on principle than letting the other party claim credit for government accomplishments. Parties will use these accomplishments in the next campaign and even a small gain in a tightly balanced environment might lead to a change in the balance in power. So divided government together with a competitive political environment should lead to less effective government.
The five GPP measures are all indicators of a business-oriented approach to governing.
This leads me to expect that polarization effects might not be as great as in the Ford Foundation/ Kennedy School Awards-which reward "innovation" rather than simply bureaucratic performance. Since innovation may reflect liberal rather than conservative ideologies (Knack, 2002, 774-775) , the sign on legislative ideology may be positive rather than negative.
Good Government: The Models
Since these six models are not independent, I estimated the regressions using Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated equation (SUR) technique. I report the SUR estimates in Table 2 . It is not just polarization that matters a lot, but also the dominant ideology in a state's legislature. On all five GPP measures, the more conservative a state is, the better functioning its government-which may not be so surprising, since the management criteria seem to be patterned on a business model. For innovation, however, a more liberal state majority party is important.
The biggest impact for legislative ideology comes for information technology--an average grade change from C-to A as we move from the most liberal to the most conservative legislature. Here is further evidence for the polarization of technological innovation. Republican states seem to have made greater technological advances than northern states, so it is not surprising that IT management gets higher grades in states with conservative majority parties.
Managing for results also is strongly affected by a conservative ideology-once again increasing from a C-to an A over the range of legislative ideology. Financial management is two grades higher where the majority party is the most conservative, while the human resources management grade is just over one rank higher in such states. Given the power of both mass and elite polarization for human resources management, there may be only a limited role for ideology itself on this dimension. The Ford Foundation/Kennedy School awards are higher when the governing state legislative party is more liberal. The most liberal state will receive an additional 3.5 accolades.
There are also strong effects for three of the five GPP measures, but not for the Ford Foundation/Kennedy School innovation awards, for traditional party organizations. States with very powerful parties will have, on average, management scores two grades lower than those with weak parties for financial management, information technology management, and managing for results. When a state has divided government and close political competition, it will score two grades lower than a state with unified government on human resources management, information technology, and managing for results-and it will receive two fewer Ford Foundation/Kennedy School awards.
The civil state does indeed seem to encourage more effective government. Across most of the measures, a trusting citizenry promotes better governance. So does a lower degree of polarization between the legislative parties-though partisan conflict among the public does not seem to matter as much-and, for human resource management, it even seems to promote higher rankings. Beyond greater trust and lower levels of elite polarization, strong parties and divided government with closely divided parties also lead to lower grades on effectiveness. The most effective government, then, seems to rest on a civil state that has high levels of generalized trust, lower amounts of partisan conflict among elites, and weaker party organizations. When one party has control of the legislative and executive branches, government is also more effective-especially in contrast to divided government with high levels of party competition.
Better management depends upon a conservative majority party, but greater innovation reflects a liberal governing party. There is hardly uniform agreement on what constitutes good government, so it is not surprising that good "management" gets high scores in conservative states and "innovation" ranks more highly in liberal states. And since innovation may reflect policies more salient to the public, the greater link between Ford Foundation/Kennedy School awards to mass polarization makes sense. Since the bureaucracies respond directly to state legislatures, legislative polarization should matter more-and it does.
The Civil State and Honest Government
One criteria for good government that gains widespread support is honesty. Corrupt governments rob the public purse and take away funds that could be used for more productive purposes (Mauro, 1997, 7)-and corrupt officials look out more for themselves than for the public weal. Corruption leads to ineffective government (Mauro, 1997, 5; LaPorta et al., 1998, 32 )-indeed, corruption is sometimes used as an indicator of ineffective government (Knack and Keefer, 1997) . Across countries, corruption leads to higher tax evasion; lower growth; fewer expenditures for the public sector, education, or transfer payments from the rich to the poor; lower levels of government responsiveness, more bureaucratic red tape, and a less effective judiciary (Uslaner, 2004) . Corruption is the scourge of good government. A one party state, and especially a state with strong parties, will likely lead to greater corruption. In one party states, politicians don't fear that someone is looking at their performance carefully-and they have little fear that they might be thrown out of office if they are found ethically wanting. A more vigilant citizenry can, in the words of former Virginia Lt.
Governor Henry Howell, "keep the big boys honest." I examined a variety of measures of political activity and include only one-the share of citizens in a state who make a political speech. This is a tiny fragment of the population, but it does point to an elite that is active in political affairs-that may have access to the media. Traditional party organizations are the 9 Uslaner, The Civil State (20)
homes of old-line political machines, sources of patronage and dishonesty.
________________ Table 3 about here I report the regression for perceptions of corruption in the states in Table 3 below. The corruption measure I use is the one that seems the most reliable: the reporters' perceptions of the level of corruption (Boylan and Long, 2001 available has a mean of 3.484 and a standard deviation of 1.038, while the estimated sample has a mean of 3.578 and a standard deviation of 1.114 (with higher scores indicating greater corruption on a scale from 1.5 to 5.5). The omitted states, then, are slightly more trusting and a bit less corrupt-but the differences do not seem great.
High levels of trust and greater black/white inequality lead to lower levels of corruption-while we find more corruption in one party states and in states with very powerful political parties. The index of corruption ranges from 1.5 (least) to 5.5 (most). Moving from the least to the most trusting state, corruption increases by 1.17-a change equivalent to the distance between Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. As the black-white poverty ratio increases, corruption rises by 1.25, the gap between Utah and Rhode Island. The most dominant party system has a corruption ranking .862 higher than the least and strong party states are .98 "more corrupt"-an increase equivalent from moving from Ohio to Rhode Island. As the share of citizens reporting making a political speech rises from less than one percent to slightly more than 9 percent, perceived corruption falls by 1.3 percent, the difference between Maryland and Rhode Island. There is also little evidence that institutional structures matter. Structural variables such as gubernatorial power or legislative professionalism (King, Zeckhauser, and Kim, 2001) fade to insignificance once trust and polarization are taken into account. Legislative professionalism does not even predict corruption (or the lack of it) when added to the model in Table 3 . We might expect that Interest group strength in the states could lead to less effective government-since interest groups fight for their own interests against the common weal-or "good government" groups such as Common Cause might promote better government (King, Zeckhauser, and Kim, 2001) . In my models above, the good and the bad effects of interest groups wash out in the face of trust, polarization, and competition.
Corruption is rather sticky. Across 52 countries, the correlation of a corruption What you get out of government is what you put into it. You need a civic citizenry to get a civil state. Possibly, the argument might work the other way around-good government produces good citizens (Brehm and Rahn, 1997) . But this seems less likely. Government management is out of sight for most people, so it seems unlikely that citizens learn to trust one another, and especially people who are different from themselves, by judging financial auditing or capital budgets. More generally, people use rather different criteria for judging government performance and deciding whether to trust others (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 5) .
Government performance and honesty are important and its link to generalized trust, inequality, polarization, and political competition suggest that reform is more than an exercise in political engineering. Some states are simply better candidates for good government than others.
Structural tinkering, such as a more professionalized legislature, may be in George Bernard
Shaw's message about second marriages, may represent "the triumph of hope over experience." Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors under coefficients in parentheses. + Significant in opposite direction from hypothesized. All tests one-tailed except for constants. N = 44 **** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10 
